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We document the establishment and evolution of a cooperative norm among workers using
evidence from a natural field experiment on a leading UK farm. Workers are paid according to a
relative incentive scheme under which increasing individual effort raises a worker’s own pay but
imposes a negative externality on the pay of all co-workers, thus creating a rationale for coopera-
tion. As a counterfactual, we analyze worker behavior when workers are paid piece rates and thus
have no incentive to cooperate.
We find that workers cooperate more as their exposure to the relative incentive scheme increases.
We also find that individual and group exposure are substitutes, namely workers who work along-
side colleagues with higher exposure cooperate more. Shocks to the workforce in the form of new
worker arrivals disrupt cooperation in the short term but are then quickly integrated into the norm.
Individual exposure, group exposure, and the arrival of new workers have no effect on productivity
when workers and paid piece rates and there is no incentive to cooperate.
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The ability to cooperate, namely to abstain from individually profitable actions for
the sake of the common good, is a key determinant of economic performance in
settings  where individual  and social  optima  do not  coincide.  In  this  paper  we
present evidence from a natural field  experiment  to document the establishment
and evolution of a cooperative norm.1
The  experiment  was  run  in  collaboration  with  the  management  of  a
leading farm in the United Kingdom. Our subjects are farm workers, whose main
task is to pick fruit. Workers are paid according to a relative incentive scheme that
provides a rationale for cooperation. Under the relative scheme, each worker's pay
depends on the ratio of her individual productivity to the average productivity of
the group of her  co-workers.  Increasing  individual  effort  therefore increases  a
worker's own pay but imposes a negative externality on all co-workers by raising
average  productivity  and  lowering  co-workers'  pay,  other  things  equal.  The
welfare of the group is  maximized  when workers fully  internalize  the negative
externality  their  effort  places  on others  and  cooperate  to  exert  the  minimum
feasible level of effort.
In previous work using  data from the same  experiment  we have shown
that, on average, workers managed to cooperate to some extent under the relative
incentive scheme (Bandiera et al 2005a). In other words, the productivity of the
average worker lies between those predicted in two benchmark models of worker
behavior – the individualistic Nash equilibrium,  and the Pareto optimum among
workers.
In this paper we analyze how cooperation evolves with time, namely how
the behavior of a worker is affected by her exposure to the relative scheme, by the
exposure of her co-workers and finally  how workers react to the arrival of new
individuals who are unaware of the norm. It is important to stress that cooperation
can arise either because of altruism or collusion; workers might cooperate either
because  they  truly  care  about  colleagues'  payoffs,  or  because  they  have
established  an  implicit  collusive  agreement  enforced  by  credible  threats  of
punishment.  In  this  paper  we  focus  on  how  cooperation  evolves  with  time,
regardless of its underlying motives.2
To provide a counterfactual,  workers on the same farm at the same point
of the year in the following season were paid piece rates. Under this compensation
1. Following the taxonomy developed in Harrison and List (2004), the experiment falls into the
"natural field" category as the subjects naturally undertake the task in the environment under study
and they are not aware of being involved in an experiment.
2. The economic environment we study has a number of features that facilitate both collusion
and altruism. For example, workers live and work together, interacting repeatedly both inside and
outside the work environment. This makes it relatively easy for  them to build social ties, and
provides a variety of mechanisms to provide transfers and enforce punishment. In Bandiera et al
(2005a) we show that workers cooperate only when they can monitor each other actions, which
suggests that cooperation is not driven by pure altruism.
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scheme  each worker's  pay depends  only  on their  own productivity  and  hence
workers have no incentives to cooperate. The analysis of how individual behavior
changes with time and with the characteristics of co-workers in this counterfactual
scenario  allows us to separate the effects of individual  and group exposure on
cooperation from their effect on productivity per se.
We address three questions.  First,  we analyze  whether  workers learn to
cooperate as  their  exposure to the scheme  increases.  To identify  the effect  of
exposure  on  cooperation  we  use  daily  data  on  each  worker's  productivity.
Identification of the parameters of interest thus arises from the comparison of a
given worker to herself at different  points in time,  implying  that time invariant
sources of unobservable  individual  heterogeneity,  such as  worker's  ability  and
motivation,  are controlled  for  throughout.  Importantly,  the  organization of the
farm is  such  that  workers  do  not  pick  fruit  everyday,  which  creates  a  wedge
between  the  workers'  exposure  to  the  relative  incentive  scheme  and  their
experience with fruit picking. This wedge allows us to separate the effect of time
on learning how to reduce productivity to "game" the incentive scheme from the
effect of time on learning how to pick fruit and thus increase productivity. Finally,
we exploit the fact that different workers arrive on the farm at different points of
the  season  to  establish  whether  individuals  in  early  arrival  cohorts  learn  to
cooperate at the same rate as later cohorts that arrive after the norm is established.
Second,  we  investigate  whether  group  exposure  is  a  substitute  for
individual exposure, namely whether workers with low exposure to the scheme
cooperate more  when  they work alongside  workers who  are familiar  with  the
norm, and whether individual exposure loses relevance once other workers in the
group are familiar  with the norm. To this  purpose we exploit  the fact  that  the
group of co-workers an individual is assigned to changes on a daily basis.
Third,  we present evidence on whether shocks to the group, such as the
arrival  of  new  workers  who  are  unaware  of  the  cooperative  norm,  disrupts
cooperation and, if so, whether the effect is long lasting.
Our main  results  are follows.  First,  individuals  cooperate more,  namely
their productivity is significantly lower, as their exposure to the relative incentive
scheme increases. This effect is significantly larger for the cohort of early worker
arrivals,  namely  individuals  who started working  at the beginning  of the peak
season when the scheme was first introduced.
Second, individuals cooperate more when they work with co-workers who
have been exposed to the scheme for longer and hence are more familiar with the
norm.  This  effect  is  larger  for  the  cohort  of  late  worker  arrivals,  namely
individuals who arrive after the cooperative norm has been established. We find
that  individual  and  group  exposure  are  substitutes,  so  the  marginal  effect  on
productivity of individual exposure becomes weaker as group exposure increases
and vice versa.
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Third,  the arrival of new workers who are unaware of the norm disrupts
cooperation,  namely  workers  who  work  alongside  new  arrivals  significantly
increase their  productivity.  The disruption is  however short lived -- on average
new workers learn to behave according to the cooperative norm within a week of
their arrival.  Moreover, the disruptive effect  of new arrivals becomes weaker as
the average exposure of the group they join increases.
None  of  these  effects  are  present  in  the  counterfactual  strategic
environment  when  workers are paid  piece  rates and  hence  have  no  reason to
cooperate. In particular, neither individual nor group exposure affect productivity,
and the arrival  of new workers does not  change  the behavior  of workers who
arrived earlier in the season.
In summary, the findings indicate that under a relative incentive scheme,
individuals quickly learn how to cooperate in the workplace, that individual and
group exposure are equally  important in determining levels of cooperation, and
that individuals are able to quickly transmit the cooperative norm to new arrivals.
Our findings have direct relevance for the experimental literature on public
goods and common pool resources games as the strategic environment individual
workers face under the relative incentive scheme shares elements of both types of
game. Since the seminal works of Isaac et al (1985) and Andreoni (1985), a well
established finding is that cooperation in laboratory experiments decays with time
(Ledyard 1995).  Our results  can be reconciled  with the laboratory evidence  by
noting  that  our  context  differs  from  the  standard  laboratory  setting  in  two
important  respects  –  individuals  can  communicate  and  punish  each  other
throughout the duration of the experiment. Indeed, laboratory evidence suggests
that  cooperation  increases  when  subjects  are  allowed  to  punish,  express
disapproval  and  communicate  (Fehr  and  Gächter  2000,  Ostrom et  al  1992,
Masclet et al 2003, Carpenter and Seki 2005).
More generally,  our results  are consistent  with the finding  that  learning
and experience have a large effect on individual behavior in both laboratory and
field experiments. Slonim and Roth (1998) show that people learn how to play the
ultimatum game as the pattern of offers converge to the equilibrium predictions
when the same  subjects  play repeatedly.  In a  series  of field  experiments,  List
(2003, 2004) shows that market experience eliminates market anomalies, namely
individuals  with substantial trading experience  are more likely to overcome the
endowment effect.
Our paper contributes to this literature as it provides evidence from a field
setting  on  how  individuals  learn  to  cooperate  over  time,  both  from  their
experience and the experience of others, and it  sheds light  on the robustness of
cooperative  norms  to  shocks  caused  by  the  arrival  of  new  inexperienced
individuals.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
context  for  the  study,  the  design  of  the  experiment,  and  the  data.  Section  3
presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
1. Experiment and Data Description
1.1. The Experiment
To provide  evidence  on the establishment  and evolution of cooperation in  the
workplace  we  exploit  a  natural  field  experiment  run  in  collaboration  with  a
leading producer of soft fruit in the United Kingdom. Our subjects are university
students from Eastern Europe, hired as seasonal farm workers for three to six
months.3
The workers' main task is  to pick fruit  on a number  of fields each day.
Workers work alongside each other but they are assigned their own row of fruit
and pick independently from others; namely,  each worker's productivity depends
solely on her own effort and field conditions.
Workers live on the farm, nearby the fields,  and interact repeatedly both
inside and outside the work environment. The organization of the workplace thus
provides opportunities for workers to build  social ties with others and provides
workers  a  variety  of  mechanisms  by  which  to  make  transfers  or  hand  out
punishments  to  enforce  cooperative  norms.  The  magnitude  of  such  transfers
across workers, as well as the individual incentive to deviate from a cooperative
norm, are expected to be large because the real value of earnings for workers on
the farm is high. Gross monthly earnings at the UK minimum wage (€ 1105) are 5
times as high as at the minimum wage in  Poland (€ 201) and almost  20 times
higher than in Bulgaria (€ 56).4
The rationale for cooperation derives from the fact that workers are paid
according to a relative incentive scheme. For two consecutive months during the
first half of the 2002 peak picking season, workers face a compensation schedule
of the form;
(1) compensation = βKi, 
3. There are ten nationalities represented in the data, both genders are equally represented, and
individuals  are  aged  20  to  25  years.  In  order  to  be  recruited,  individuals  must  be  full-time
university  students,  have  at  least  one  year  before  graduation,  and  must  return  to  the  same
university in the Fall. Only a handful of workers are hired for two consecutive seasons.
4. This monthly minimum wage data is from Eurostat, January 2003. These differences remain
even if PPP adjustments are made. Not surprisingly, three quarters of workers in our sample report
coming to the farm for financial reasons.
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where β is the unit wage and Ki is the total kilograms of fruit picked by worker  i
on the field-day.  The productivity of worker  i,  yi, is  defined as the amount  of
kilograms of fruit she picks per hour. The defining feature of the incentive scheme
is that the unit wage β is endogenously determined by the average productivity of
all workers on the field-day. Hence β is set according to;
(2) β = w/μy,
where w takes the same value throughout the season, and μy is the average hourly
productivity  of all  workers  in  the same  field  on the same  day.  There are,  on
average, forty workers on each field-day. At the start of each field-day the farm
manager announces an ex ante picking rate based on her expectations of worker
productivity. This picking rate is revised at the end of each field-day to ensure a
worker with productivity μy earns the pre-established hourly wage w.
Under relative incentives an increase in worker i's effort increases her own
pay, but also increases the average productivity on the field-day and thus imposes
a negative externality on her co-workers by reducing the unit wage β in (2). The
relative incentive scheme creates a wedge between individual and group optima,
thus  providing  a  rationale  for  cooperation.  To be  clear,  in  this  setting  higher
cooperation corresponds  to lower  productivity.  We then employ daily  data on
individual  productivity  to  analyze  how  cooperation  evolves  with  time,  as  a
function of individual and group exposure to the relative scheme.
To  disentangle  the  effects  of  cooperation  on  productivity  from  other
factors that can lower productivity through time, we use daily data on individual
productivity during the first half of the 2003 peak picking season, when workers
are  paid  piece  rates  and  thus  have  no  incentive  to  cooperate.  The  piece  rate
compensation schedule is the same as in (1) but the unit wage β is set ex ante and
is not revised according to average productivity. An increase in worker i's  effort
then does not affect the unit wage received by her co-workers, namely there is no
externality and the individual optimum coincides with the group optimum.5
5. In a dynamic framework workers may under perform if they believe that working hard will
result in management setting lower piece rates in the future. There are two reasons why in this
setting, there are unlikely to be such large ratchet effects.  First,  given the stochastic nature of
agricultural production, it is difficult for workers to disentangle changes in the piece rate due to
changing conditions and those  due to management  learning about  workers'  true ability.  Such
ratchet concerns have been documented in firms where productivity shocks are less common such
as shoe making (Freeman and Kleiner 2005) and bricklaying (Roy 1952). Second, the effect of a
worker's current performance on the unit wage she faces in the future is weak as the unit wage is
field-day specific and workers are reallocated to different fields in different days. In particular,
workers face uncertainty over which fields they will be assigned to in the future and about the
identity of their future co-workers.
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The 2003 season provides an appropriate counterfactual as the farm uses
the same technology on the same set of fields and employs workers from the same
pool  of  individuals  in  both  years.  Workers  originate  from  the  same  set  of
countries,  attend  the  same  set  of  universities,  and  so  the  age,  gender  and
nationality distributions are very similar across the two years.
Our  previous  work  compares  the  average  behavior  of  workers  under
relative incentives to the average behavior of the same workers later in the 2002
season when they were paid piece rates and thus had no incentive to cooperate
(Bandiera  et al 2005a). We show that, notwithstanding the large group size,  the
productivity  of the average worker was at least  50 percent  higher  under  piece
rates than under  relative  incentives  and  that  this  was due to workers  partially
internalizing  the negative  externality.  In this  study we build  on these previous
results to understand the establishment of the cooperative norm and the evolution
of cooperation over time.
For  this  purpose,  the  first  half  of  the  2003  season  provides  a  better
counterfactual than the second half of 2002. This is so because in the second half
of  the  same  season  workers  have,  for  example,  higher  levels  of  picking
experience, more established social ties with co-workers, and greater familiarity
with  the  organization  of  the  farm.  These  factors  cloud  identification  of  the
parameters of interest in this study. In contrast, in the first half of 2003 workers
are more comparable to the workers in the first half of 2002 along each of these
dimensions.  Moreover,  characteristics  at  the  field-day  level  such  as  field
conditions and group exposure are also  more comparable  across treatment  and
control groups.
1.2. The Data
We retrieve workers' productivity on each field and each day on which they pick
fruit from personnel records. Productivity is defined as kilograms picked per hour,
and is measured electronically by assigning a unique bar code to each worker. The
personnel records also contain information on the identity of all co-workers on
each field-day, and on the dates of arrival and departure for each worker on the
farm.
The relative incentive scheme was in  place for the first half of the peak
season in  2002, from mid-May until the first week of July.  This represents our
treatment season. The control season is the first half of the peak season in 2003,
from early May until the end of June.6
6. Thus the peak season started 10 days earlier in 2003. Since overall the peak season has the
same length in the two years, the comparable sample for 2003 ends at the end of June, that is 10
days earlier than in 2002.
6
Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 6 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 4
Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/7/16 4:38 PM
The fruit type that is picked is the same in both seasons. The 2002 sample
covers  289  workers,  15  fields,  150  field-days,  and  provides  a  total  of  6177
worker-field-day level  observations.  The 2003 sample  covers 349 workers,  14
fields, 152 field-days and provides 9858 worker-field-day level observations.7
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
The table highlights that on average, worker productivity is about 60% higher in
2003 under piece rates, compared to 2002 under the relative incentive scheme.8
To  analyze  the  evolution  of cooperation  with  time  we  assess  whether
individual  productivity  depends  on  the  individual's  exposure  to  the  relative
scheme. If workers learn how to cooperate, they should work less hard as their
exposure, defined as the cumulative number of days the worker has been present
on the farm,  increases.  Importantly,  while  workers are present on the farm for
every day of their stay in the UK, they do not pick fruit every day.9
This is so for two reasons. First, as workers are hired on a casual basis the
employment contract provides no guarantee of being employed each day. Hence
on days  in  which  there  is  less  fruit  to  be  picked  some  workers  may  be  left
unemployed. Second, on some days workers will be engaged in non-picking tasks
only,  such as planting  or weeding. The allocation of workers between picking,
non-picking tasks, and unemployment is made by management on the basis of the
demand for labor on each task.
These  factors  create  a  wedge  between  the  picking  experience  of  each
worker, that is the cumulative number of days the worker has been picking fruit,
and  the  workers'  exposure  to  the  scheme.  The  fact  that  workers  accumulate
picking  experience  at  an  exogenously  different  rate  to  their  exposure  to  the
scheme allows us to separately identify  the effects of experience and exposure.
This is  important because as time passes workers might  learn how to cooperate
with others and  how to "game"  the relative  incentive  scheme by exerting  less
effort. This  is  so if  the cooperative norm can be communicated to all workers,
even if those workers themselves are not picking fruit and hence not being paid
according to the relative incentive scheme. At the same time, however, workers
naturally become more productive as they accumulate picking experience.
Table  1  shows  that  there  is  no  difference  in  the  amount  of  picking
experience  among workers across the two seasons;  workers are exposed to the
7. While the farm is physically the same in the two years, yields were higher in 2003 due to a
combination of weather conditions and the maturity of plants. The number of hired workers was
accordingly higher in 2003 compared to 2002.
8.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  productivity  in  the  first  half  of  the  2003  season  is  not
significantly different from productivity in the second half of the 2002 season (not reported) when
workers' were paid piece rates. This is consistent with workers cooperating to lower productivity
under the relative incentive scheme in 2002.
9. In our sample, workers pick fruit on average every other day. The ratio of picking days to
total days on the farm is 48% for 2002 and 51% for 2003.
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farm a week more in  2002 than in  2003 but  this  difference  is  not  statistically
significant.
An second important source of quasi-random variation that we exploit in
the analysis  is  in  the time of arrival of workers. Workers arrive on the farm at
different  points of the season partly  because of variations in  term dates across
universities in their home countries. In addition, farm management aims to keep
constant the supply of labor over the peak picking season.10
As each individual's work permit places an upper bound on how long they
can work for, a stable supply of labor is ensured by staggering the issue of work
permits.  As shown in Figure 1 and in the first  panel of Table 1, some workers
arrive in  April  before the start  of the peak picking  season,  while  others arrive
during the peak season. Two points are of note. First, the pattern of arrivals  is
very similar  in  the treatment  and control years.  Second, workers arrive  almost
every week during the season and this creates variation in the average exposure of
the group of workers at any given point in time. Most workers stay throughout the
peak season and, on average, they depart some nine more weeks after the end of
the peak picking period in either year. The personnel records also indicate that no
worker was fired in either year.11
Table 1 reports two characteristics of the group of workers on the field-day
that are used later in the analysis.  The first is average group exposure, defined as
the mean of exposure of each worker in a given field day. The second is the share
of new arrivals, defined as the number of workers on the field-day who have been
on the farm for less than one week divided by the total number of workers on the
field-day. In line with individual exposure being higher in 2002, we also find that
group  exposure  is  higher  in  2002.  The  share  of  new  arrivals,  defined  as  the
number of workers with less than one week exposure divided by the total number
of workers on the field-day,  is  also slightly  higher  in the 2003 season as more
workers arrive later.
Finally, Table 1 reports data on the average field life cycle as a measure of
field conditions. The life cycle is defined as the number of days the field has been
picked until day t divided by the total number of days that the field is picked over
the season. This captures a key feature of the fruit growing technology, that is, the
quantity of fruit available  in a field depletes over time. Average field  conditions
are not significantly different across the two samples.
10. Fruit is planted some years in advance to ensure a near constant supply of fruit over the
peak picking season. Hence it is optimal to have a near constant supply of labor over the peak
season.
11. A few workers, accounting for 3% of total observations, leave before the end of our sample
in either year. The results are not affected if we drop these "early leavers" from the sample.
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2002 Season
2003 Season
Figure 1: Distribution of Worker Arrivals by Season
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Notes: The first week of the picking season is defined to be the week beginning from the
first Monday of April in each season.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
2002 Season 2003 Season
Worker Characteristics
     April arrival cohort 83 100
     May arrival cohort 70 135
     June arrival cohort 136 114
     Total 289 349
Worker Characteristics
(means, standard deviations in parentheses)
Worker productivity (kg/hr) 4.92 8.06
(3.13) (4.10)
Picking experience (days) 11.3 11.3
(8.27) (8.32)
Individual exposure (days) 27.1 20.9
(21.0) (16.0)
Field-Day Characteristics
(means, standard deviations in parentheses)
Field life cycle (0-1) .504 .520
(.108) (.105)
Group exposure (days) 29.6 20.0
(11.7) (7.45)
Share of new arrivals on field-day (0-1) .164 .239
(.162) (.201)
Notes: Productivity is defined as kilograms of fruit picked per hour. Individual exposure equals 
the cumulative number of days the worker has spent on the farm since fruit picking started.
Picking experience is the cumulative number of days the worker has been picking fruit. The
field life cycle is defined as the cumulative number of days a field has been operated divided by
the total number of days the field is operated during the season. Group exposure is the mean
exposure of workers on the same field on the same day. The share of new arrivals is the
number of workers with less than one week exposure divided by the total number of workers on 
the field-day. The sample from the 2002 season covers 289 workers, 15 fields, 150 field-days,
and provides a total of 6177 worker-field-day level observations. The sample from the 2003
season covers 349 workers, 14 fields, 152 field-days and provides 9858 worker-field-day level
observations.
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2. Empirical Analysis
The  empirical  analysis  proceeds  in  three  stages.  First,  we  analyze  how  the
behavior of a given worker changes as a function of her exposure to the relative
incentive  scheme.  That  is,  do  workers  become  more  or less  cooperative  over
time?  Second,  we analyze  how the behavior  of a  given  worker  changes  as  a
function of the average exposure of her co-workers. That is, do workers cooperate
more when they work in groups that are more familiar with the norm? Third, we
ask  whether  cooperation  is  disrupted  by  the  arrival  of  new  workers  that  are
unaware of the norm, and whether workers learn to deal with new arrivals over
time.
Throughout  we  use  2003 as  a  control group to  separately  identify  the
effect of the variables of interest on cooperation from their effect on individual
productivity per se. Indeed, while  the allocation of workers to a given field-day
might depend on information that is available to the farm management and not to
the econometrician, we are able to isolate the effect of the variables of interest on
cooperation to the extent that the omitted variables are orthogonal to the incentive
scheme  in  place.  Observing  workers  under  relative  incentives  and  piece  rates
allows us to separate the effect of, say,  group exposure on productivity through
cooperation, which is only relevant under the relative incentive scheme, from the
spurious  effect  of  unobservables  that  determine  group  composition  and
productivity under both schemes.
2.1. Individual Exposure
We estimate the following panel data regression on the stacked 2002-2003 data,
where all continuous variables are in logarithms;
(3) yift = γ
02d02Xit + γ
03d03Xit + δTit + ηZft + αi + φf + uift, 
where yift denotes the productivity of worker i on field f on day t. Xit measures the
worker's  exposure,  namely  the  number  of  days  she  has  spent  on  the  farm,
independent of whether she he been picking or not. The dummy variables d02 and
d03 take a value of one in 2002 and 2003 respectively,  and zero otherwise.  The
coefficients  of  interest  are  γ02 and  γ03 which  capture  the  effect  of  individual
exposure on productivity in 2002 and 2003 respectively.12
The  null  hypothesis  is  that  individual  exposure  has  no  effect  on
cooperation and hence productivity,  that is  γ02  = γ03  =  0. If individual exposure
12. We checked for robustness to functional form here and in the two following models using a
linear, log-linear and quadratic specification for the RHS variables and a linear specification for
the LHS. Findings are robust to these alternative specifications.
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affects productivity  only through its  effects  on cooperation we expect  γ02 ≠  0,
γ03 =  0, that is the effect of exposure is zero only when there is no rationale for
cooperation.  If  workers  learn  to  cooperate  as  their  exposure  to  the  scheme
increases we expect  γ02 < 0, while  if repetition destroys cooperation the opposite
occurs so that γ02  > 0.
Tit measures  the  worker's  picking  experience,  that  is  the  cumulative
number of days the worker has picked fruit until day t. This captures the fact that
workers become more productive as they accumulate experience and allows us to
separate  the  effect  of  exposure  on  cooperation  from  the  natural  increase  in
productivity due to the positive returns from picking experience.  Zft measures the
life  cycle of field  f on day t. This is defined as the number of days the field has
been picked until day t divided by the total number of days that the field is picked
over the season. As the technology and characteristics of hired workers are the
same  in  the  two  years,  we  assume  the  effects  on  productivity  of  picking
experience and field life cycle are the same across years.13
We include  workers'  fixed  effects,  αi,  to capture time  invariant  worker
level determinants of productivity such as the value of their outside option, innate
ability, and intrinsic motivation. The effect of individual exposure and experience
is thus identified by comparing a worker to herself at different points in time. This
ensures that individual exposure and experience do not proxy for unobservable
time  invariant  worker  characteristics  that  drive  productivity.  Therefore  the
parameters  of  interest  are  consistently  estimated  even  if,  for  example,  more
motivated workers arrive earlier and thus have higher exposure, or if more able
workers are selected to pick more frequently and thus have more experience.
A  further  concern  arises  if  ability  or  other  unobservables  affect  the
probability of being selected differently at different  points in  time. For instance
this  could  happen if  it  takes time  for managers  to learn how to identify  good
pickers so that unobserved ability has a stronger effect on the probability of being
selected later in the season. Our identification relies on the assumption that any
spurious time varying effects are the same in the two seasons. Namely, since we
identify the effect of exposure on cooperation by comparing the effect of exposure
on productivity in the 2002 and 2003 seasons, inferences about the difference in
workers' behavior between the two years can still be made as long the bias is the
same  in  the  two  seasons.  In  the  example  above  this  entails  assuming  that
managers learn at the same rate in the two seasons, which is sensible given that
the identity of managers and workers differ  each season, managers and workers
are chosen from a similar  pool of applicants each year,  and all other aspects of
farm operations are unchanged.
13. A test of the hypotheses that the coefficients of picking experience and of the field life
cycle are the same in 2002 and 2003 fails to reject the null once individual exposure is controlled
for.
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Finally,  we include field  fixed effects,  φf , to capture time invariant field
level determinants of productivity such as soil quality or plant spacing. Note that
while some of the fields are the same in the two years we treat them as different in
(3). The reason for this is that the fruit type grows on a three year cycle, implying
that the crop on a given field in 2003 is one year older than the crop on the same
field  in  2002.  The  field  fixed  effects  thus  also  absorb  any  level  differences
between the two years.
The  disturbance term,  uift,  captures unobserved determinants  of produc-
tivity  at the worker-field-day level.  Observations within the same field-day are
unlikely  to be independent  since  workers face  similar  field  conditions.  This  is
accounted  for  by  clustering  standard  errors  at  the  field-day  level  in  all  the
regressions.
Table 2 presents estimates of (3). Column 1 shows the baseline estimate of
(3) without controlling for individual exposure. As is  intuitive,  the results show
that  productivity  increases  as  workers  accumulate  picking  experience,  and
decreases as fields get later into their life cycle.14
We introduce our variable of interest, individual exposure, in Column 2.
We find that conditional on the worker's picking experience, individual exposure
has a significantly negative effect on productivity in 2002 (γ02 < 0). In comparison
to the  specification  in  Column  1,  the coefficient  on picking  experience  rises,
which given that exposure has a negative effect  on productivity,  is  as expected
because experience is positively correlated with exposure.15
Quantitatively,  the  coefficients  imply  that  a  one  standard  deviation
increase  in  worker's  picking  experience,  evaluated  from  the  mean,  increases
productivity by 7.8%. A one standard deviation increase in  individual exposure
decreases productivity by 17.3%. Finally,  a one standard deviation increase in the
field life cycle decreases productivity by 14.3%.
Individual  exposure  has  no  effect  on  productivity  in  2003  (γ03 =  0).
Importantly,  this is not due to the coefficient  being imprecisely estimated. Since
the key difference between the two years is that in 2002 workers have incentives
to cooperate while in 2003 they do not, we interpret the result as indicating that
the longer  a  worker is  exposed to the relative incentive  scheme,  the more she
cooperates by reducing her productivity when she actually picks.
In Column 3 we test the hypothesis that the effect of exposure depends on
the worker's  month of arrival.  We divide  workers into  three month of arrival
14. The worker and field fixed effects are also jointly significant. By themselves, worker fixed
effects explain 36% of the variation in productivity, highlighting the importance of controlling for
unobserved worker heterogeneity throughout.
15.  In contrast,  the coefficient  on  the field life  cycle  is unchanged over  the two columns
suggesting that the experience and exposure of workers is uncorrelated to the stage of  the life
cycle on fields to which they are allocated.
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Table 2: Individual Exposure
Dependent variable = Log worker productivity (kg/hr)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by field-day
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Exposure Cohort
Picking experience  .047*   .083**    .115***
(.027) (.034) (.034)
Field life cycle    -.822***   -.805***    -.584***
(.187) (.185) (.215)
Individual exposure 2002    -.193***
(.053)
Individual exposure 2003 .022
(.036)
April arrival cohort x individual exposure 2002    -.847***
(.184)
April arrival cohort x individual exposure 2003 -.098
(.119)
May arrival cohort x individual exposure 2002    -.366***
(.081)
May arrival cohort x individual exposure 2003 -.055
(.045)
June arrival cohort x individual exposure 2002   -.168**
(.066)
June arrival cohort x individual exposure 2003 .025
(.047)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations (worker-field-day) 16035 16035 16035
Adjusted R-squared .4284 .4375 .4438
Notes: All continuous variables are in logarithms. Individual exposure equals the cumulative 
number of days the worker has spent on the farm since fruit picking started. Picking 
experience is the cumulative number of days the worker has been picking fruit. The field life 
cycle is defined as the cumulative number of days a field has been operated divided by the 
total number of days the field is operated during the season.
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cohorts – April, May and June – and allow the coefficients of interest, γ02 and γ03,
to differ across cohorts. Intuitively, early arrivals have to establish the cooperative
norm while late arrivals find the norm already in place. This implies the effect of
exposure should be stronger for early arrivals  than for later arrivals  who might
learn how to cooperate from the existing workers.
The pattern of coefficients are largely in line with this reasoning. For the
cohort of workers who arrive in  April,  evaluated from the mean,  a fifteen day
increase in individual exposure reduces productivity by 22.2%, by 18.7% for the
May cohort, and by 13.8% for the June cohort.
In contrast, in the 2003 season, month of arrival has no effect on worker
productivity. The interactions of exposure with month of arrival are actually more
precisely  estimated  for  2003  than  2002,  the  point  estimates  are  orders  of
magnitude smaller than for 2002, and close to zero.
These results can also be represented graphically.  To do this we estimate
(3)  without  controlling  for  individual  exposure.  In  Figure  2  we  then  plot  the
residuals  from this  regression  against  individual  exposure,  for  each month of
arrival  cohort.  This  shows  how  the  unexplained  component  of  worker
productivity – after worker fixed effects,  field  fixed effects, picking experience
and field  life  cycle  are controlled for – relates to individual exposure, and how
this varies by month of arrival.  The Figure shows that earlier cohorts cooperate
more  as  their  exposure  to  the  relative  incentive  scheme  increases,  whereas
workers in the last cohort cooperate almost immediately from when they arrive on
the farm. Both Column 3 of Table 3 and the lower panel of Figure 2 show that
exposure does not matter for any cohort in 2003.
A natural explanation for the differential effect of exposure by month of
arrival is that workers who arrive in June find that their co-workers have already
established a cooperative norm under relative incentives,  and that this norm can
be imposed onto later arrivals.  The next two subsections explore this hypothesis
in more detail.
2.2. Group Exposure
We estimate the following panel data regression;
(4) yift = ψ
02d02Gift + ψ
03d03Gift + δTit + ηZft + αi + φf + uift, 
where  Gift is  the mean exposure of worker  i's co-workers in field  f on day  t. If
worker i learns from her co-workers, she should cooperate more, and hence have
lower productivity, when she works alongside others who are more familiar with
the  norm.  Given  that  the  identity  of  co-workers  changes  each  field-day,  we
15
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2002 Season
2003 Season
Figure 2: Time Series of Productivity Residual, by Month of Arrival
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identify the effect of group exposure on individual productivity by comparing the
worker to herself as she works alongside different co-workers.
A necessary condition for the parameters of interest,  ψ02 and  ψ03, to be
consistently estimated in (4) is that there is no systematic year-specific correlation
between Gift and uift. Namely, the identifying assumption is that any unobservable
that creates a spurious correlation between  Gift and  yift does so regardless of the
incentive scheme in place. For instance, if workers who have been on the farm for
longer are more likely to be assigned to a low productivity field (so that Gift and
yift are  negatively  correlated),  identification  requires  this  to  hold  true  in  both
seasons.  In other words, we assume that the rule according to which managers
allocate workers to fields is orthogonal to the incentive scheme in place.
While  managers  might  want  to  alter  group  composition  to  reduce
cooperation  under  relative  incentives,  data  on  group  composition  suggests
otherwise.  To  keep  the  comparison  as  clean  as  possible  we  look  at  group
composition in the first and second half of 2002, when the same managers choose
from the same pool of workers and the only difference is the incentive scheme in
place. We find that the probability  of working in  the same group as one's self-
reported friends or in the same group as people who live in the same caravan is
the same under both schemes (55% and 60% respectively).  The mean share of
workers on the field  who  are friends  of a  given  worker  is  .043 under  relative
incentives  and  .037  under  piece  rates,  the  difference  not  being  statistically
significant. Finally,  the mean share of workers on the field who are of the same
nationality  of a given worker is  .175 under  relative  incentives  and .156 under
piece rates, the difference again is not significant. We also note that if managers
were  to  allocate  workers  to  groups  to  discourage  cooperation  under  relative
incentives,  we should observe less variation in  group composition across field-
days under relative incentives, leading to less precise estimates.16
The result in Column 1 of Table 3 shows that under relative incentives, a
given worker cooperates more when she works in a group that has higher mean
exposure.  Evaluated from the mean,  a one standard deviation increase in  mean
exposure  of  the  group  of  co-workers  decreases  productivity  by  12.4%  under
relative incentives. 
16. One possible explanation for managers' behavior is that they do not internalise the effect of
group composition on the farm's profits because, being paid a fixed wage, they have no stake in it.
Data from a different experiment (Bandiera et al 2005b) indeed shows that when managers' pay is
conditional on workers' performance, managers significantly change how they allocate workers to
fields.
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Table 3: Group Exposure
Dependent variable = Log worker productivity (kg/hr)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by field-day
(1) (2) (3)
Exposure Cohort Interactions
Group exposure 2002   -.422**   -.904**
(.218) (.383)
Group exposure 2003 -.048 -.068
(.080) (.123)
April arrival cohort x group exposure 2002 -.206
(.205)
April arrival cohort x group exposure 2003 -.085
(.083)
May arrival cohort x group exposure 2002    -.558***
(.206)
May arrival cohort x group exposure 2003 -.058
(.088)
June arrival cohort x group exposure 2002 -.455
(.322)
June arrival cohort x group exposure 2003 .024
(.107)
Individual exposure 2002    -.743***
(.289)
Individual exposure 2003 .158
(.129)
Group exposure x individual exposure 2002   .186**
(.094)
Group exposure x individual exposure 2003 -.039
(.048)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations (worker-field-day) 16035 16035 16035
Adjusted R-squared .4347 .4358 .4445
Notes:  All continuous variables are in logarithms. Individual exposure equals the 
cumulative number of days the worker has spent on the farm since fruit picking started. 
Group exposure is the mean exposure of workers on the same field on the same day. Other 
controls include worker's picking experience and the field life cycle.
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In comparison,  a one standard deviation increase  in  picking  experience
increases productivity by 4.8%.17
Column 2 repeats the analysis allowing the coefficients of interest to vary
by month of arrival cohort. Although the results by cohort are not as pronounced
as for individual exposure, we still  find  that group mean exposure significantly
reduces the productivity of May and June arrivals relative to those workers that
arrive in April. This is consistent with the idea that workers who arrive when the
norm is already in place are more affected by the exposure of their colleagues. In
other words, early arrivals learn how to cooperate, establish the norm and transmit
their knowledge to new arrivals.
The  final  specification  sheds  light  on  whether  individual  and  group
exposure are substitutes – namely  whether  individuals  learn to cooperate both
from by being individually exposed, and from working alongside co-workers who
have  been exposed. To do this we re-estimate (4) and allow for an interaction
between group and individual exposure. The result in Column 3 shows that both
individual  and  group  exposure  favor  cooperation  under  the  relative  incentive
scheme.  Their  interaction  is  positive,  suggesting  that  the  marginal  effect  of
individual exposure is smaller in absolute value on field-days when an individual
works alongside high-exposure co-workers. Similarly, the exposure of co-workers
has a smaller effect on workers that have been individually  more exposed to the
relative incentive scheme.
Figure 3 illustrates this finding. We plot the marginal effect of individual
exposure as a function of group exposure and vice versa. The marginal effect of
individual  exposure varies  from -.2 log points in  a  group that  has  20 days  of
exposure on average, to zero when the average group exposure rises to 50 days.
Similarly,  the marginal effect of group exposure is eight times larger for a worker
with five days individual exposure compared to a worker who has been exposed
to the scheme for 50 days. To provide an indication of the relative importance of
individual versus group exposure we evaluate the marginal effect  of each at the
mean level of the other. We then find that the marginal effect of group exposure is
to reduce productivity  by .33 log points,  and the marginal  effect  of individual
exposure is to reduce productivity by .23 log points.
The fact  that, conditional on individual exposure and experience,  group
exposure  still  has  a  significant  effect  on  workers'  behavior  under  relative
incentives, implies that individuals learn the cooperative norm from others. In our
setting  this  is  not  surprising  as  individuals  can  communicate  to  each  other,
17. One concern may be that an individual that intends to break the cooperative norm prefers
to work alongside co-workers with higher levels of group exposure. This is because such a group
has lower  productivity,  hence a higher unit wage  β,  and therefore the returns to breaking the
cooperative  norm are higher. However,  such  an endogenous  allocation of  workers to field  by
group exposure would bias ψ02 downwards in absolute value and so provide a lower bound on the
true effect.
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Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Individual and Group Exposure
Marginal effect of individual exposure, as a function of group exposure
Marginal effect of group exposure, as a function of individual exposure
-.
6
-.
4
-.
2
0
.2
m
ar
gd
ay
s0
2
0 20 40 60 80
meanexposure
-1
-.
8
-.
6
-.
4
-.
2
0
m
ar
ge
xp
o0
2
0 20 40 60 80 100
dayshere
Notes: All Figures are for the 2002 season. Individual exposure is equal to the cumulative
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the number of workers with less than one week exposure divided by the total number of
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deviators from the cooperative norm can be costlessly identified, and there are a
variety of mechanisms through which they can be punished.18
Finally,  the  last  specification  in  Table  3  reaffirms  that  the  effects  of
exposure on productivity  go  through cooperation as  we  find  no  evidence  that
group or individual exposure affect  productivity in  2003. The 2003 coefficients
are estimated precisely throughout and are close to zero.
2.3. Shocks: New Arrivals
In  this  subsection we  analyze  the impact  of shocks,  namely  what  happens  to
cooperation when new workers who are unaware of the norm join workers on the
field-day. We estimate the following specification;
(5) yift = λ
02d02Nft + λ
03d03Nft + δTit + ηZft + αi + φf + uift, 
where Nft  is the share of workers on field-day ft who have less than one weeks
exposure, and we restrict the sample to workers who have more than one week
exposure.  The  coefficients  of interest,  λ02 and  λ03,  measure  the  effect  of  new
arrivals  on  the  productivity  of  existing  workers.  If  new  arrivals  disrupt
cooperation, that is they cause productivity to rise, then λ02 > 0 and λ03 = 0. The
second condition is necessary to ensure that new arrivals affect productivity solely
through their effect on cooperation. If the share of new arrivals  were correlated
with the productivity of every worker on the field-day for spurious reasons, for
example if new arrivals were allocated to fields that are easier to pick, we would
find  λ03 ≠  0.  As  with  previous  estimates,  the  comparison between  λ02 and  λ03
allows us to identify the presence of any spurious correlation that might arise for
similar reasons over the two years.
Estimates of (5) are presented in Table 4. The result in Column 1 shows
that  new  arrivals  disrupt  the  cooperation  norm  under  the  relative  incentive
scheme.  The  presence  of  workers  with  less  than  one  weeks  exposure  to  the
scheme causes the productivity of other workers on the field-day to significantly
increase. Quantitatively,  an increase in the share of new arrivals by one standard
deviation from its mean, increases the productivity of other workers by 11.6% in
2002, while new arrivals have no significant effect in 2003 when workers are paid
according to piece rates.
18. Huck et al (2004) show the conditions under which, in the context of a game of Cournot
competition, trial and error learning leads players to converge to the joint profit maximizing levels
of  output. While such a process of learning does not fit  our data, we cannot rule out workers
imitating the behavior of others. Learning processes with some element of imitation have, in the
Cournot setting, been shown to converge to the collusive levels of output (Apesteguia et al 2002).
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Table 4: New Arrivals
Dependent variable = Log worker productivity (kg/hr)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by field-day
(1) (2) (3)
Arrivals Arrivals Exposure
Share of new arrivals 2002    1.20*** 5.74
(.414) (3.64)
Share of new arrivals 2003 .075 -.286
(.175) (1.52)
Share of new arrivals (1 to 4 days) 2002   1.14**
(.486)
Share of new arrivals (5 to 7 days) 2002   1.36**
(.638)
Share of new arrivals (8 to 11 days) 2002 -.640
(.466)
Share of new arrivals (12 to 14 days) 2002 -.087
(.429)
Share of new arrivals x individual exposure 2002 .243
(.246)
Share of new arrivals x individual exposure 2003 -.050
(.229)
Share of new arrivals x group exposure 2002 -1.77*
(1.06)
Share of new arrivals x group exposure 2003 .101
(.483)
Individual exposure 2002    -.479***
(.133)
Individual exposure 2003 -.079
(.103)
Group exposure 2002 .283
(.274)
Group exposure 2003 -.248
experience .040 -.077 .035
(-.038) (.078) (.038)
field life cycle -.326 -.285 -.245
(.228) (.561) (.248)
(.168)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Test 1: 1 to 4 days = 5 to 7 days (p-value) .7546
Test 2: 8 to 11 days = 12 to 14 days (p-value) .3692
Number of observations (worker-field-day) 12858 4089 12858
Adjusted R-squared .4441 .3299 .4529
Notes: All variables are in logarithms. Individual exposure is the cumulative number of days a worker has spent on the farm
since fruit picking started. Group exposure is the mean exposure of workers on the same field on the same day. Share of new
arrivals is the number of workers with less than one week exposure divided by the total number of workers on the field-day.
The samples in Columns 1 and 3 exclude workers with less than seven days of exposure. The sample in Column 2 excludes all
workers with less than fourteen days of exposure. Other controls include worker's picking experience and the field life cycle.
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Column 2 investigates further  precisely  how long  recently  new arrivals
have to have been exposed to the relative incentive scheme to cause this effect on
the  pre-existing  cooperative  norm.  To  ease  exposition  we  focus  on the  2002
sample,  and  on  workers  that  have  at  least  two  weeks  of  exposure.  We  then
separate new arrivals into four groups according to whether they have between 1
and 4 days exposure, between 5 and 7, between 8 and 11 and between 12 and 14.
We find that the effect of the first two groups is the same, namely workers with
any level of exposure between 1 and 7 days are equally disruptive. Furthermore,
seven  days  is  the  threshold  level  of  individual  exposure  beyond  which  new
arrivals do not disrupt cooperation.
One interpretation is that new workers learn the norm when they socialize
with others on their first weekend. The data does not however allow us to explore
this hypothesis any further since most workers begin employment on Mondays, so
that their first weekend occurs after seven days.
Finally,  Column  3 investigates  whether  existing  workers  learn to  cope
with new arrivals over time, namely whether the marginal impact of new arrivals
decreases with individual  and group exposure.  For this purpose, we control for
individual and group exposure in (5), and for their interactions with the share of
new arrivals.
We find  that  new arrivals  are less disruptive  when they first  work in  a
group comprising of workers who are more familiar with the cooperative norm --
the interaction between group exposure and the share of new arrivals is negative
and significant at the 10% level in 2002. In contrast, there is no interaction effect
between individual exposure and the share of new arrivals.  This suggests, as is
intuitive, that it is the group of co-workers as a whole, and not specific individual
workers, that learn to cope with the presence of new arrivals.
In the control group in 2003, new arrivals on the field-day have no direct
effect on the productivity of their co-workers, nor do they have differential effects
as individual or group exposure vary. This lends support to the hypothesis that the
presence of new arrivals has an effect through the ability of the group to sustain a
cooperative norm, rather than some other mechanism that affects productivity.
3. Conclusions
In this paper we exploit a natural field experiment to document the establishment
and  evolution  of  a  cooperative  norm  among  workers.  The  rationale  for
cooperation derives from the fact  that workers are paid  according to a relative
incentive  scheme.  Under  this  scheme,  increasing  individual  effort  increases  a
worker's own pay but imposes a negative externality on all co-workers by raising
average productivity and lowering co-workers' pay. The welfare of the group is
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maximized  when  workers  fully  internalize  the negative  externality  their  effort
places on others and cooperate to exert the minimum feasible level of effort.
To identify how cooperation evolves through time we use panel data on
each worker's  productivity from personnel files  and exploit  three quasi-random
sources of variation in  the data –  that  workers begin  employment  at  different
times, that there is a divergence between how long a worker has been exposed to
the relative incentive scheme and how long they have actually worked under it,
and that workers are re-allocated to different groups of co-workers each day.
We find that individuals learn how to cooperate, namely a given individual
works less hard as her exposure to the relative incentive scheme increases. This
effect is  strongest for workers who begin employment  when the scheme is first
introduced. Exposure to the scheme has a significantly smaller effect for workers
who arrive when the cooperative norm is already well established.
Individuals  cooperate more  when  they work alongside  co-workers that
have been exposed to the scheme for longer. This effect is strongest for workers
who start employment later, when the relative incentive scheme has been in place
for at least a month. Moreover, individual and group exposure are substitutes --
the marginal effect of individual exposure falls  as group exposure rises and vice
versa.
Finally,  the arrival of new workers who are unaware of the cooperative
norm disrupts cooperation. In other words, existing workers cooperate less when
they work alongside new arrivals.  The disruption is  however only temporary as
new arrivals  conform within  a  week of starting  employment.  Finally,  workers
learn how to cope with new arrivals -- the effect on the productivity of existing
workers  of these  new arrivals  is  smaller  when  the  group of co-workers  have
greater levels of exposure to the relative incentive scheme.
While in our setting the rationale for cooperation stems from the incentive
contract  individuals  are offered,  our results  apply  more generally  to games  of
public  goods provision  and  common  resource  management.  A  first  important
implication of our results is to provide field evidence to corroborate experimental
results  in  such  games.  We  show  that  individuals  cooperate  outside  of  the
laboratory,  and  in  line  with existing  experimental  evidence,  if  individuals  can
communicate  and  socially  sanction  other  players,  cooperative  norms  tend  to
strengthen over time, and become more robust to the arrival of new players.
Second, under the relative  incentive  scheme  workers have  incentives  to
cooperate  because  each  worker's  effort  imposes  a  negative  externality  on co-
workers.  Of course,  in  many  strategic  environments  the actions  of individuals
place positive externalities on others. Understanding the establishment, evolution,
and robustness of cooperative norms in such strategic environments, remains open
findingsto future research.
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